

~~SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 March 1952

SUBJECT: NIE-27/1: CHINESE COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions with respect to Taiwan through 1952.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Except for a substantial increase in air capabilities, the over-all capabilities of the Chinese Communists to launch either a large-scale invasion or limited surprise attacks against Taiwan remain substantially unchanged since April 1951 when NIE-27 was published. Chinese Nationalist capabilities to defend Taiwan have not improved substantially since that date.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

2. Provided that US policy with respect to Taiwan continues, Chinese Communist operations against Taiwan would almost certainly fail.

a. A large-scale Communist invasion attempt would almost certainly fail unless surprise were achieved to assure a fait accompli before US air and naval forces could be brought to bear. We do not believe that, under present circumstances, the Communists could achieve such surprise in a large-scale attack.

b. A Communist attack with a limited number of elite troops probably could achieve surprise, but the Nationalists, without outside assistance, could almost certainly contain such an attack, unless the Communists received timely large-scale reinforcements. US naval and air forces could almost certainly prevent such reinforcements.

3. If US policy with respect to Taiwan should change and the US did not participate in the defense of Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist forces almost certainly could not successfully defend Taiwan against a large-scale Communist operation.

SECRET

4. We believe that the Chiang Kai-shek regime is unlikely to be overthrown as a result of factional strife. The removal of Chiang, however, would lead to rivalries among military leaders that would considerably weaken morale.

5. On balance, military, propaganda and other indications do not suggest that the Chinese Communists plan an early attack against Taiwan.

6. Irrespective of whether the present situation in Korea continues, an armistice is concluded, or large-scale hostilities are renewed, we believe that the Chinese Communists will not attack Taiwan during the period covered by this estimate provided that the US does not withdraw its commitment for the defense of Taiwan.

7. During the period of this estimate, the Communists will probably conduct reconnaissance, nuisance, or destruction raids (either by air or sea) against Nationalist-held offshore islands and may assault and capture some of these islands. However, we do not believe such actions will necessarily indicate that an invasion of Taiwan was imminent.

8. Over the longer term, we believe that the Chinese Communists will attempt to seize Taiwan if a favorable opportunity should

SECRET

present itself. However, if the relative military strength of the United States and the Communists in the Far East remains substantially unchanged, and if US policy with respect to Taiwan is not changed, we believe the Chinese Communists will not hazard a military attack on Taiwan.

DISCUSSION

I. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST SITUATION

The Chinese Army

1. Since April 1951, when NIE-27 was published, there has been no significant change in the estimated strength and effectiveness of Chinese Communist troops in position for an attack against Taiwan. Approximately 249,000 troops are estimated to be deployed along the mainland east coast opposite Taiwan (Chekiang, Fukien, and Eastern Kwangtung Provinces). In addition, approximately 151,000 troops which are deployed in the Canton and Shanghai areas could be utilized for operations against Taiwan. (See Map). This total force of 400,000 includes an artillery division and several thousand other specialized troops. Its combat effectiveness is estimated to be approximately equal to that of Chinese Communist troops in Korea.

SECRET

2. Reports of unknown reliability indicate that at least 25,000 Chinese Communist troops have received airborne training in North China and Manchuria. If these reports are true, this force could be available for operations against Taiwan. There have also been reports that Chinese Communist troops have been receiving amphibious training, but we do not believe that this type of training has been conducted on a large-scale.

3. In the event of a resumption of full-scale hostilities in Korea, the forces discussed above would probably still be available for operations against Taiwan.

4. In case of an armistice in Korea, up to 300,000 of the troops presently committed to Korean operations could be redeployed to the mainland invasion coast for operations against Taiwan.

The Chinese Communist Air Force

5. The over-all capabilities of the Chinese Communist Air Force for operations against Taiwan have increased substantially since the publication of NIE-27 and the CCAF is now a formidable military force. The total aircraft strength of the CCAF in operational units has increased from 650 to 1700 between April 1951 and February 1952. Jet fighter strength increased from 400 to 900 during this period. CCAF sortie rates have increased significantly. (See Annex A).

SECRET

6. The major part of the CCAF is engaged in operations against UN forces in Korea and is based in Manchuria and North China. There are, however, elements of the CCAF based south of the Yangtze: an estimated 37 jet fighters at Canton, 74 jet fighters at Hankow, 74 jet fighters and 40 piston fighters at Shanghai, and 80 piston light bombers at Nanking. Even in the case of these aircraft, redeployment would be necessary before the Communists could launch a large-scale air offensive against Taiwan. Substantial logistic build-up would precede or accompany such redeployment and would probably be detected.

7. In addition to those aircraft already based south of the Yangtze, the Communists could, without appreciable effect on their present scale of air operations in Korea, make available for an attack on Taiwan 120 piston fighters, 120 ground attack bombers, and 160 light bombers. By the end of 1952 it is estimated that the Chinese Communist air capabilities will have been substantially increased to the extent that the Communists could deploy 185 jet fighters, 160 piston fighters, 120 ground attack, 240 light bombers, and a substantial portion of the 150 available transports against Taiwan.

SECRET

SECRET

8. During the past several months the Communists have continued their intensive airfield construction and improvement program along the mainland east coast. There are now 32 first-class airfields within 500 nautical miles of Taiwan. Six of these are within jet fighter operational radius of Taiwan.

9. If fighting in Korea is expanded to include UN air attacks against targets in China proper and/or Manchuria, it is probable that the Communist capability for air operations against Taiwan would vary inversely with the intensity and duration of the expanded operations.

10. In the event of an armistice in Korea, a substantial part of the aircraft available to the Communists in China could be redeployed to South China with little delay. However, the supply and movement of fuel and other essential requirements would be difficult and would take time.

The Chinese Communist Navy

11. The capabilities of the Chinese Communist Navy to support amphibious operations against Taiwan would be limited to the following:

- a. Minelaying and minesweeping operations in Chinese waters.

SECRET

- b. Reconnaissance, including the use of small craft.
- c. Amphibious operations against Nationalist-held islands off the China coast.
- d. Surprise MTB attacks and possibly suicide boat attacks on US or Nationalist naval forces.
- e. Limited anti-submarine escort for merchant shipping.
- f. Patrol of Chinese coastal waters, employing both conventional naval vessels and motor junks converted to naval use.

12. Chinese Communist naval capabilities would not be significantly affected by either an armistice or by an intensification of hostilities in Korea.

Chinese Communist Capabilities for Large-Scale Attack on Taiwan

13. Limitations on Chinese Communist Capabilities for Large-Scale Assault. The Chinese Communists are poorly prepared to cope with the problems involved in a large-scale amphibious operation. Their previous amphibious experience has been limited to short overwater hauls and coastal movements. The Communists have few conventional landing craft and consequently must employ a heterogeneous

SECRET

assortment of vessels including junks. Loading and coordinating the movement of this fleet would present formidable problems. Air support for such an operation would be hampered by the lack of Communist experience in air-naval-amphibious operations. Furthermore, disembarkation of troops and equipment would have to be accomplished without offshore naval support. Finally, the Communists would have to seize port facilities on Taiwan before a large part of the invasion fleet could be off-loaded.

14. Amphibious Lift. We estimate that the Chinese Communists have the capability of lifting simultaneously about seven armies, of approximately 210,000 men. However, the Chinese Communists have available amphibious craft and shipping of greater than 1,000 gross registered tons to lift only two armies, or 60,000 fully equipped men. The remainder would have to be lifted in junks and other small craft of under 1,000 GRT. Based on a speed of advance of 4 to 5 knots, Chinese Communist forces transported in junks from embarkation points in the Swatow-Amoy area would require more than 24 hours to reach the nearest landing beaches on the west coast of Formosa. The Korean situation has no significant effect on Chinese Communist waterborne capabilities for operations against Taiwan.

SECRET

15. Airlift. Airfields on the mainland, within transport range of Taiwan, are sufficient to support large-scale airborne operations. However, Chinese Communist airlift capacity is estimated to be sufficient to carry only approximately 2,700 troops a distance of 500 nautical miles in a single operation.

16. Logistic Support. The Chinese Communists would face serious logistical difficulties in supporting a large-scale assault against Taiwan.

- a. Although local roads in the mainland east coast area are being improved, there are no rail lines or through highways nets in Fukien, in eastern Kwangtung or Southeastern Chekiang. Thus, prior to undertaking a large-scale invasion, the Communists would have to stockpile materiel and concentrate most of the required troops in the immediate vicinity of the outloading ports.
- b. Assuming stiff resistance on Taiwan, re-enforcement and resupply of invasion forces would require a substantial daily waterlift and maintenance of air and sea supremacy in the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese Communists probably do not possess the air and naval capabilities to fulfill these requirements in the face of US participation.

SECRET

17. Neither an armistice in Korea nor renewed large-scale hostilities in Korea would substantially change Chinese Communist capabilities in this regard.

18. Possibility of Surprise. Under present conditions it would be virtually impossible for the Chinese Communists to achieve surprise in a large-scale assault.

- a. Transportation, storage and port facilities in the port areas (Amoy, Foochow, and Swatow) opposite Taiwan are inadequate for the staging of a large-scale invasion. In any event, large concentrations of troops and materiel would be difficult to conceal from US or Nationalist observations, although there might be an appreciable time lapse between the beginning of preparations for an invasion and the detection of these preparations.
- b. If the Communists staged a major portion of the invasion force from more distant ports such as Canton and Shanghai, it would reduce the chance of detection of concentrations opposite Taiwan. Although this might increase the chance of strategic

SECRET

surprise, the increased distance involved would require major elements to be at sea for 48 hours, in advance of the fleet leaving from ports opposite Taiwan, thus reducing the chances of tactical surprise. (See Annex B).

- c. Even if the Communist were to achieve surprise and succeed in landing troops on Taiwan, the US Pacific Fleet could be brought to bear within 48 hours and US aircraft should arrive some hours earlier. Communist unloading would hardly have been finished by this time, and if the attacking force had met even limited resistance on the beaches, it would not have made much progress. Thus the Communists would face virtual isolation of their landing force together with the loss of much of their shipping and a large part of the equipment they had succeeded in landing on the beaches.

Chinese Communist Capabilities for Limited Surprise Attack

19. A Communist assault in Taiwan could be successful only if it could be completed before US naval and air units -- most of which are stationed in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines --

SECRET

could be brought to bear. The Communists probably could achieve surprise in an attack on Taiwan only if they limited the invasion force to airborne troops and such other troops as could be carried by conventional landing craft. In terms of personnel this would amount to approximately 2,700 airborne troops and 25,000 seaborne troops.

Effect of Meteorological Factors on a Large-Scale or Limited Assault on Taiwan

20. Considering the inherent difficulties of any amphibious operations, the heterogeneous nature of the invasion fleet, and the necessity for staging from a number of embarkation points, we believe that the Chinese Communists will consider favorable weather over an extended period of time as essential to their operations. Unfavorable weather conditions, in the form of strong northeasterly to northerly winds which blow more than 70 percent of the time, are experienced from October through March. As a result, heavy seas would seriously hinder the movement and debarkation of troops during this period. The Chinese Communists would therefore probably await the more favorable period from April through September before conducting an assault of either a large-scale or limited nature. (See Annex C).

SECRET

II. THE CHINESE NATIONALIST SITUATION

The Chinese Nationalist Army

21. There has been no significant change in the strength, disposition, and composition of the Nationalist Ground Forces since the publication of NIE-27. The Chinese Nationalist Army has a strength of 455,000 personnel, the bulk of which is disposed on Taiwan. The combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Army as a whole remains low, although it may improve somewhat over the next year as MAAG efforts bear fruit. Materiel and training deficiencies, absence of large unit and combined training, and incompetent leadership on the high levels continue to hamper the development of the Nationalist Army. In addition, the Generalissimo's policy of divide and rule, the promotion of officers based on personal allegiance, and the system of political police continue to affect the morale of the armed forces adversely and to undermine the authority of unit commanders.

The Chinese Nationalist Air Force

22. The strength and combat effectiveness of the CNAF has remained substantially at the low levels noted in NIE-27. In relation

SECRET

SECRET

to the CCAF, however, the CNAF is in a much worse position than it was at the time NIE-27 was written. The principal deficiencies of the CNAF are the absence of jet aircraft, lack of combat experience and training, poor maintenance and shortage of equipment and spare parts. The CNAF has 320 World War II-type aircraft in tactical units, of which 118 are piston fighters and 36 light bombers. The CNAF is not capable of providing an effective air defense for Taiwan. (See Annex A for a comparison of CNAF and CCAF sortie capabilities.)

The Chinese Nationalist Naval Forces

23. The capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist Navy have improved somewhat over the low levels indicated in NIE-27, but the Nationalist Navy is not an effective deterrent to a Communist assault on Taiwan.

Stability of the Nationalist Regime

24. The Nationalist Government is relatively stable and serious factional strife is not expected so long as President Chiang Kai-shek heads the government. Chiang has had long experience in maintaining authority in spite of factional rivalries and much of his power derives from the fact that all factions acknowledge

SECRET

him as the supreme arbiter in settling factional disputes and rivalries. The death of Chiang Kai-shek or his sudden removal in the unlikely event of a coup would, however, have serious consequences. Under such circumstances, factional strife might occur and it is improbable that any other Chinese Nationalist could command a like degree of loyalty. Because of the intensely personal nature of loyalty in the armed forces, rivalry between military leaders would considerably weaken morale, although Nationalist military capabilities to defend Taiwan would be only slightly lessened unless these rivalries developed into armed clashes between rival elements.

III. PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST ASSAULT

25. Unless given outside assistance, the Chinese Nationalists are not capable of defending Taiwan against a large-scale Communist invasion attempt. Given timely support by the US Naval and Air Forces, the Chinese Nationalists could defeat Communist invasion forces. As long as US policy with respect to Taiwan is not changed, the conclusion of an armistice in Korea would not significantly affect Chinese Communist relative capabilities with respect to Taiwan since the increase in Communist capabilities for operations in the Taiwan area would be countered by the increase in US capabilities for defending Taiwan.

SECRET

26. The Chinese Nationalists without outside assistance and irrespective of the course of events in Korea are considered capable of containing and destroying Communist forces engaging in limited surprise attacks.

27. The Chinese Nationalists have reduced the Communist subversive potential on Taiwan so that it would not be a serious threat even if subversive actions were coordinated with a large-scale invasion or limited surprise attacks.

28. In case of the eruption of prolonged factional strife over control of the Nationalist Government, the Nationalist defensive capabilities would be further weakened. Even under such circumstances, however, we do not believe the Chinese Communists would attack Taiwan unless the United States had withdrawn its commitment to defend the island.

IV. INDICATIONS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN

Military Indications

29. Early Large-Scale Invasion. Available intelligence does not indicate that the Chinese Communists are preparing for a large-scale invasion of Taiwan within the next few months.

SECRET

- a. There have been no indications of troop or materiel build-ups in or near the outloading ports.
- b. There have been no indications that the Communists are assembling or training the waterlift for amphibious operations. (In the spring of 1950 when an attack on Taiwan appeared probable, intelligence, including reconnaissance, reports revealed a Communist waterlift build-up over a period of months.)

30. Limited Surprise Attacks. Although limited attacks against Taiwan could be launched with little warning, it is significant that necessary preliminary actions have apparently not been taken:

- a. There is no evidence that Chinese Communist para-troop units are adequately trained to engage in coordinated air operations or are deployed outside of Manchuria or North China.
- b. There have been no indications of a significant deployment of Communist aircraft to bring them within operational range of Taiwan.

SECRET

31. Future Attacks on Taiwan. There are several military developments that could indicate longer range plans for a Communist attack on Taiwan.

- a. The movement of jet fighters and light bomber aircraft from Manchuria and North China to such areas as Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, and Canton might be an indication of preparation for a future attack on Taiwan. We believe, however, that this deployment is primarily defensive.
- b. Communist assaults already taken against small Nationalist-held islands (see Map) can be interpreted as preparations for an invasion of Taiwan. Communist occupation of these islands increases their capability for concentrating shipping, troops, and supplies unobserved. On balance, however, we believe that such action is probably the first of a series of operations presently designed to deprive the Nationalists of bases for intelligence operations, guerrilla warfare, or for any contemplated assault of the mainland.

SECRET

- c. The airfield at Swatow, which has not been used for a long time, is now being rehabilitated and enlarged.

Propaganda Indications

32. Recent Chinese Communist propaganda has not stressed the intention to "liberate" Taiwan in the near future. Whereas the 1950 New Year's message of the Central Committee stated that part of the task for the coming year was to "liberate Taiwan, Hainan Island, and Tibet," the various messages in 1951 subordinated the question of Taiwan to the more general struggle against American "imperialism," and gave no assurance of any specific action against Taiwan during 1951. The 1952 official New Year's editorial cited Taiwan merely as a case of US aggression and made no reference to the island's "liberation." Chairman Mao's New Year's message for 1952 made no mention of Taiwan.

33. Such statements as Chou En-lai's political report to the CPPC on 23 October 1951 in which he declared the "Chinese peoples are determined to liberate Taiwan from the grip of the American aggressors and will never relax until they have achieved that end"

SECRET

SECRET

indicates that Peiping has not abandoned the "liberation" of Taiwan as an ultimate objective. The "liberation of Taiwan" has also been declared to be one of the results to be achieved by Peiping's program of military modernization.

34. Although Chinese Communist propaganda no longer includes the "liberation of Taiwan" as an early Communist objective, this omission cannot be regarded as decisive. The Communists probably would not feel compelled to justify their assault on Taiwan in advance and might wish to conceal their intentions to invade Taiwan.

Indications from Communist Activities in the UN

35. Soviet and Satellite representatives in the UN demonstrated considerably less interest in Taiwan during 1951 than in 1950. Although the USSR repeatedly charged the US with plotting aggression against Communist China and Southeast Asia, including the transportation of KMT troops from Taiwan to Thailand and Burma, these charges seemed to be a part of the general Soviet propaganda offensive against the US and not specifically designed to lay the groundwork for a possible invasion of Taiwan.

SECRET

SECRET

V. CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN

36. So long as the US does not withdraw its commitment to defend Taiwan, we believe that the Chinese Communists will not attempt large-scale or limited military assaults against Taiwan, irrespective of the Korean situation.

- a. The Communists must estimate that an attack on Taiwan during 1952 would almost certainly result in a crushing Communist defeat by US naval and air forces. The Communists must also estimate that US counteraction would probably include bombardment of ports of embarkation, and might include bombardment of interior lines of communication, and air attacks on major urban and industrial areas throughout China.
- b. As long as the Communists desire to continue negotiations in Korea, it is unlikely that they will attack Taiwan.
- c. If Korean negotiations should fail and fighting were intensified in Korea and extended to China, the threat of US countermeasures would obviously

SECRET

no longer be a deterrent. However, we believe that under these circumstances Chinese Communist military capabilities would be so reduced as to preclude the possibility of an attack on Taiwan.

37. During the period of this estimate, the Communists will probably conduct reconnaissance, nuisance, or destruction raids (either by air or sea) against Nationalist-held offshore islands and may assault and capture some of these islands. However, we do not believe such actions will necessarily indicate that an invasion of Taiwan was imminent.

38. Over the longer term, we believe that the Chinese Communists will attempt to seize Taiwan if a favorable opportunity should present itself. However, if the relative military strength of the United States and the Communists in the Far East remains substantially unchanged, and if US policy with respect to Taiwan is not changed, we believe the Chinese Communists will not hazard a military attack on Taiwan.

SECRET

ANNEX A

CNAF VS CCAF SORTIE CAPABILITIES

The CNAF, with its 118 piston fighters presently in tactical units, is estimated to be capable of mounting a maximum air defense effort of 310 sorties during an initial 24 hour period or 59 sorties per day for a sustained 30 day operation. As opposed to this the CCAF, with the aircraft estimated to be available for possible operations against Taiwan in 1952, is estimated to be capable of mounting the following air effort from airfields in Fukien Province within operating radius of Taiwan:

Type	No.	Sorties Initial (24 hours)	Average daily sorties for a sustained 30 day operation
Jet Ftrs	185	500	90
Piston Ftrs	160	425	80
Ground Attack	120	315	60
Light Bombers	240	630	120
Transport	150	370	75
	855	2240	425

Sortie capabilities for both air forces are based on an average of three missions during the initial 24-hour period with maximum of 90% serviceability (after preparatory stand down) and attrition rates of 1.5% for piston fighters, 1.8% for light bombers, 1.8% for attack aircraft, and 9% for transport (assault). The maximum sustained combat rate is estimated to be 15 sorties per month

SECRET

per plane for all types in both air forces listed above. No attrition rate is applied for sustained operations since it is assumed that combat losses will be compensated for by replacement aircraft. No combat attrition factor has been applied to decrease estimated CCAF jet fighter sorties since they will not be opposed by jet fighters in the CNAF. The combat attrition of the CNAF piston fighters has been computed on the basis of piston type opposition; it is believed that if the CNAF piston fighters encounter CCAF jets, the combat effectiveness of the former would be reduced to an insignificant level within a short period. In view of the foregoing, the CNAF is not considered capable of providing an effective air defense for Taiwan against air attacks the CCAF could mount from the China mainland.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX B

PORTS AND LANDING BEACHES

1. Ports of Embarkation. The following Chinese mainland ports are considered suitable for staging an amphibious operation against Taiwan.

<u>Port</u>	<u>Port Capacity (LT/20-hr. day)</u>
LAO YAO	3,450
TSINGTAO	22,400
FOO CHOW	750
SHANGHAI	51,550
AMOY	3,450
SWATOW	750
CANTON	<u>9,300</u>
TOTAL ESTIMATED PORT CAPACITY	<u>91,650 LT/Day</u>

Some 16 additional minor ports might also be utilized. Their average capacity is 300-400 LT/20-hr. day.

2. Ports of Debarkation. The following ports on Taiwan could, if occupied by the Communists, be used to debark invasion troops and materiel.

<u>Port</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Port Capacity (LT/20-hr. day)</u>
KAO HSIUNG	SW coast	31,850
CHI LUNG	N coast	24,100
AMPIN TAIWAN	SW coast	5,850
TANSUI	NW coast	1,500
NII TAKA	W coast	<u> </u>

Total North and West Coasts..... 63,300

SECRET

<u>Port</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Port Capacity (LT/20-hr. day)</u>
HUA LIEN	E coast	2,700
SUO	NE coast	5,700
KAIKO	E coast	150
SHINKO	E coast	<u>450</u>

Total East Coast..... 9,000

TOTAL ESTIMATED PORT CAPACITY 72,300 LT/DAY

3. Amphibious Landing Beaches. There are 58 beaches on Taiwan considered suitable for amphibious landings with conventional landing craft and junks. The gradient of these beaches ranges from moderate to flat. The most favorable of these are located on the west coast in the vicinity of KAO HSIUNG (between TUNGKANG AND TAINANO), on the northwest coast between HSINCHU and TANSUI and on the east coast in the vicinity of SUO, HUALIENKANG and TAITUNG. However, beaches on the east coast lack adequate exits to the heavily populated western section of Formosa, since the only trans-island roads are found near the northern and southern ends of the island.

The six beaches between TUNGKANG and TAINAN have an aggregate useable length of approximately 25 miles. The seven beaches between HSINCHU and TANSUI have a similar total length.

No specific data are available concerning the Chinese Communist beach requirements for discharging any given tonnage.* Chinese Communist re-supply requirements (food and ammunition) are estimated

* US World War II experience: 2,500 long tons per mile of beach per day.

SECRET

to be 0.5 long tons per man per month, or approximately 3,400 long tons per day for a 200,000 man force. In terms of these requirements, no limitations are imposed on the Chinese Communists insofar as the beaches themselves are concerned.

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX C

WEATHER CONDITIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS

Period	General Conditions	Feasibility of Large-Scale Sea Operations
October thru March	Strong northeast monsoons, currents setting southwesterly through the Straits and reaching maximum drift of 60 to 65 miles per day in Dec and Jan.	Weather unsuitable for large-scale operations
April thru June	Transition period between northeast and southwest monsoon; variable winds, light and variable currents setting generally northeast; high seas and swells observed 6-10 percent of time in April and May. Typhoon may occur in June.	April and May are best months for large-scale sea operations; there is risk of encountering typhoons in June
July thru August	Southwest monsoon, average velocities low and calms frequent; sea and surf moderate. Typhoons move from Pacific due west across Taiwan into China.	Average conditions better than in April and May, but danger of typhoons makes this period less suitable.
September	Transitional period between southwest and northeast monsoons; typhoons may occur, winds are variable.	Period from late September through early October after typhoon danger is over and before strong northeast monsoon begins may not be too unfavorable for sea operations

CONFIDENTIAL